Explore through two lenses
SR/EN
AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAUTLAS

How authoritarian systems work

Clear answers based on comparative research, with sources and the limits of every conclusion made visible.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
Go to AVtokratija Open the Serbia case study with documented findings and local sources.
→

SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

Which question do you want to start with?

Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

Twenty areas guide you through the system as a whole.

Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

AUTLAS›Why the police, military, and security services obey
18
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

Why do those in power maintain several services that monitor citizens and one another?

Confidence in the conclusionquite substantiated, with important conditions
key academic works5

The government makes more services because it does not want an organization to have all the power and all the confidential information in its hands. When the police, the military, intelligence services and special units have overlapping jobs, they can monitor the citizens, but also report to each other. The leader thus gets more data sources and reduces the possibility of one command peak becoming independent.

Still, the rivalry produces serious weaknesses: the services can exaggerate threats, hide failures, duplicate business or plant competitors in order to preserve their position and budget. The number of services does not prove anything. It is important who appoints their managers, to whom they report directly, whether their competencies are deliberately overlapping and whether the law can even check their work.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The number of services does not indicate who controls them. You need to know who orders them, who pays for them and who can speak directly to the leader.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

comparing several countries or cases

Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Greitens shows why regimes divide the coercive apparatus into multiple services and build special intelligence capacities: different institutions can track citizens, but also each other, reducing the risk of one organization becoming an independent threat.
Open source ↗
A02

data from a large number of countries

De Bruin, E. (2020), How to Prevent Coups d’État, Cornell University Press.

Contribution to this answer
De Bruin shows how parallel armed organizations reduce the possibility of one service monopolizing the force and carrying out a coup. Mutual competition increases the security of the leader, but can weaken coordination.
Open source ↗
A03

comparing several countries or cases

Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), „Coup-Proofing“, International Security 24(2): 131–165.

Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), "Coup-Proofing", International Security 24(2): 131–165.

Contribution to this answer
Quinlivan describes parallel forces and mutual monitoring as classic techniques of preventing coup. The regime thus supervises not only society but also its own apparatus of force.
Open source ↗
A04

review more research

Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
Wintrobe explains why such mutual monitoring is attractive to the dictator: he never has complete information about the loyalty of his associates, so he builds systems that reduce the possibility of clandestine association against him.
Open source ↗
A05

data from a large number of countries

Timoneda, J. C., Escribà-Folch, A. i Chin, J. (2023), „The Rush to Personalize“, British Journal of Political Science 53(3): 878–901.

Contribution to this answer
Timoneda, Escrib-Folch and Chin study how failed coups can accelerate the personalization of power and changes in the leader’s attitude to the apparatus of force. The work is useful for the consequences of the fear of a coup, but it is more indirect for the question of multiple services that accompany each other.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research into clear answers about elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life.

01

Based on academic research

Answers draw on academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from relevant organizations, institutions, and investigative media. General findings and Serbia evidence are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists its sources so visitors can check the basis for its conclusions.

04

Why questions?

AUTLAS organizes dispersed knowledge through 100 questions in 20 areas, helping people understand the wider system behind familiar phenomena.

05

Focus on the system

AUTLAS analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms.

06

Who is behind AUTLAS?

AUTLAS and AVtokratija were conceived and are developed by Civic Initiatives. Content is updated in line with new research and reliable data.

CONTINUOUSLY UPDATED

Help us keep the content complete and accurate.

Send a relevant source, point out an error, or suggest how an explanation could be clearer. Every submission is reviewed before the content is changed.

Send a source, report an error, or share a suggestion